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1  Introduction
Under both the actio de pastu1 and the administrative procedure catered 
for in the Provincial Pound Ordinances2 or Regional Pound Acts,3 
compensation can be claimed by a landowner for damage caused by grazing 
and collateral damage to crops. A landowner who finds animals trespassing 
on his land has the following alternatives: he can chase the animals off the 
land,4 impound the animals and can be eventually compensated for any loss 
when the animals are sold in execution by the poundkeeper. Alternatively 
he may institute the actio de pastu for monetary compensation for damage 
caused to his land by grazing and certain other forms of damage.
Liability under both the actio de pastu and the pound legislation to pay 
compensation is strict. Fault need not be proved on the part of the owner of 
the animal that caused the damage.5 A stray animal found on land may, 
without further ado, be impounded. However, in the past the landowner who 
followed the administrative procedure available under the pound ordinances 
had certain advantages. Compensation under the pound ordinances could 
be obtained without proof of the identity of the owner of the trespassing 
animals.6 The kind of damages which could be claimed under certain of 
the pound ordinances was not limited to compensation for damage caused 
by grazing, but extended to damage for the spread of infectious diseases7 
1 See in general CG van der Merwe & M Blackbeard “Animals” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1 
2 ed (2003) paras 470-474  
2 Cape Pounds Ordinance 18 of 1938; Natal Pound Ordinance 32 of 1947; OFS Pound Ordinance 18 of 1952; 
Transvaal Pounds Ordinance 13 of 1972
3 Pounds Act (Ciskei) 43 of 1984; Limpopo Pounds Act 3 of 2002; KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act 3 of 2006; 
North West Animal Pounds Act 7 of 2010  
4 The landowner is not entitled to impound animals in a private camp on his or her land  See Trystam v 
Knight 1922 NPD 186; Pounds Act (Ciskei) ss 5(4) and 14(d); Limpopo Pounds Act s 23; North West 
Animal Pounds Act s 5(6)
5 See dicta in Kock v Klein 1933 CPD 194 197; Constant v Louw 1951 4 SA 143 (C) 148  
6 Murray v Behr (1906) 2 BAC 302
7 Cape Pounds Ordinance ss 37-39
      
and the premature covering of mares, cows and ewes.8 Under the pound 
ordinances the landowner could have the extent of the damage suffered 
determined by extra-judicial proceedings in the form of two “disinterested 
persons” nominated by him and the stockowner,9 or by the nearest justice 
of the peace,10 as umpire, and two landowners as arbitrators.11 The main 
advantage of the administrative proceedings under the pound ordinances 
was, however, that such proceedings were ultimately cheaper and speedier 
than commencing judicial proceedings under the actio de pastu. After the 
stray animals have been impounded, the poundkeeper has the authority to 
sell the animals, without giving notice to the owners, and to compensate the 
landowner for damage from the proceeds of sale.12
The constitutional validity of certain of the above provisions taken over 
in the Natal Pound Ordinance 32 of 1947 was successfully challenged in 
the High Court of KwaZulu-Natal. Thereafter the Constitutional Court was 
approached to confirm the invalidity of these provisions. In the High Court 
judgment Kondile J made the following statement:
“It has been asserted by the applicant that the apparent purpose of the offending provisions of the 
ordinance is to facilitate, for no good reason, the deprivation of stockowners’ private property in an 
environment of self-help to enrich landowners and poundkeepers. Further there is no evidence before 
the Court to show that it is in practice impossible or unduly burdensome for the landowners to recover 
damages from the stockowner. The common law action resulting from consumption of pasture (actio 
de pastu) affords landowners and stockowners equal protection and benefit of the law. It makes 
the owner of an animal which has caused damage by grazing strictly liable. In the circumstances 
there is no necessity nor justification for the oppressive and arbitrary decisions authorised by the 
ordinance which inflict immense and disproportionate hardship on the socially vulnerable landless 
rural stockowners and impoverish them.”13
The aim of this contribution is to indicate which pound provisions the 
Constitutional Court found to be invalid, and to determine whether it will still 
be worthwhile for a landowner who finds stray animals on his farm to pursue 
the stockowner under the pound ordinances, instead of instituting the actio 
de pastu to recover compensation for damage caused by grazing. By way of 
conclusion the effect of Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government 
Affairs (“Zondi”) on similar provisions in pound ordinances of the other 
regions will be considered.
8 Under Natal Pound Ordinance s 28 a landowner who finds a stallion, bull or ram trespassing on land 
reserved for his breeding stock of the same species is entitled (without being required to prove damage) 
to additional trespass fees as prescribed  Under Cape Pounds Ordinance s 41, the landowner is entitled 
to a fixed penalty for every stallion, bull or ram so found  The OFS Pound Ordinance s 45 provides for a 
special penalty to be paid to the landowner for the trespass of any stallion, bull, ram or goat-ram amongst 
his or her breeding stock  See also Pounds Act (Ciskei) s 9(2)(b)  
9 Natal Pound Ordinance s 29(1)  
10 Under sch 1 of the Justices of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act 16 of 1963, magistrates, 
additional magistrates and assistant magistrates can act as justices of the peace
11 Cape Pounds Ordinance ss 34(1) and 39
12 See the Cape Pounds Ordinance s 70; Natal Pound Ordinance s 38  
13 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 25 (N) 37A-C
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2  The Zondi judgment
In Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs,14 the 
Constitutional Court considered the validity of certain provisions of the Natal 
Pound Ordinance. The case was brought to the KwaZulu-Natal High Court 
by an unemployed 53-year-old widow who had resided on a farm with her 
husband for more than 25 years. Her only asset was her livestock, consisting 
of 28 head of cattle and eighteen goats which she inherited from her husband 
after he died. She was dependent on this livestock; she converted it into cash 
when needed and used it as a source of food from time to time. She had no 
land and had resided on the farm since the death of her husband. What gave 
rise to the present litigation was a letter of demand by the landowner calling 
upon her to remove her livestock from the farm within a month and stating 
that her livestock would be impounded if she failed to do so. In response to the 
letter the applicant launched a two-part urgent application to the High Court 
of Natal15 for an order blocking the threatened impoundment on the ground 
that there was no trespass, and for an order that nine provisions of the Natal 
Pound Ordinance were inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”). The High Court granted the first 
part of her application by interdicting the pending impoundment,16 and the 
second part challenging the constitutionality of certain sections of the Natal 
Pound Ordinance. The applicant then approached the Constitutional Court to 
confirm the KwaZulu-Natal High Court order of unconstitutionality.
As a prelude to considering the challenged provisions of the Natal Pound 
Ordinance, Ngcobo J pointed out that the ordinance operated in a complex 
social context of black people struggling for land, which they had been deprived 
of, and the need of white farmers to be protected against trespassing livestock. 
The ordinance was enacted under the old legal order which denied franchise 
and land rights to African people, restricting the African population to 13% 
of the total land in the country while the remainder belonged to white people. 
African people were confined to small, overcrowded and often desolate areas. 
They had insufficient grazing land for the small number of livestock that they 
were allowed to keep. By contrast, white farmers owned vast areas of land 
which were adequate for farming, grazing and irrigation. African people were 
forcibly removed into relocation sites in Natal, sometimes situated next to their 
former homes and grazing land. Livestock strayed back onto their old grazing 
spots on white farms that were historically theirs. Therefore people regarded 
livestock impounding as illegitimate, while the white farmers saw livestock 
impounding as their only peaceful recourse to discourage the poaching of 
grazing areas or trespass by livestock. The impounding scheme of the Natal 
Pound Ordinance operated in this historical context.17
14 2005 3 SA 589 (CC)
15 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 25 (N)
16 28H  The High Court granted an interim order that pending the final determination of the proceedings 
in the second part of the notice of motion, the farmer is interdicted from employing the provisions of the 
Pound Ordinance to remove, or cause to be removed, any livestock presently in the possession of the 
widow on the farm  
17 605A-606C
614 STELL LR 2014 3
      
The ordinance was promulgated in 1948 by the Provincial Council of the 
Province of Natal. In terms of Proclamation 107 of 1994,18 the administration 
of the whole of the ordinance was assigned to KwaZulu-Natal with effect from 
17 June 1994.19
The Constitutional Court found that the impugned provisions of the ordinance 
put in place a scheme which provided for the immediate impoundment of 
trespassing animals and their disposal. Section 16(1) permitted the immediate 
seizure and impoundment of trespassing animals by a landowner without 
giving notice to the livestock owner, unless the latter was the owner of land 
immediately adjacent and the livestock was marked with the registered brand 
of that owner. In such a case the stockowner was entitled to at least twelve 
hours written or verbal notice of the trespass before impoundment. Other 
stockowners were not expressly entitled to such notice, even if they were 
known or could, with reasonable diligence, be identified.20
In terms of the ordinance, cattle seized may be driven to the nearest 
pound. The poundkeeper is obliged, without delay, to receive into the pound 
all animals tendered to him.21 The landowner is not required to inform the 
poundkeeper who the stockowner is, but must furnish him with details about 
the number and the description of the animals impounded, the land upon 
which they were trespassing, the distance between such land and the pound, 
and the trespass fees or damages claimed.22
The poundkeeper is obliged to inform the stockowner only if his identity is 
known.23 If not, he need not take any steps to establish who the owner is, even 
if the animals are branded or marked or the stockowner could, with reasonable 
diligence, be ascertained. Trespassing donkeys or pigs may be destroyed, 
unless they are distinctly marked or the landowner knows or can with 
reasonable diligence identify and locate the owner.24 Impounded animals can 
only be released upon the payment of driving fees, trespass fees or damages 
and the entire pound, herding and tending fees and expenses incurred by the 
poundkeeper.25 In the event that the landowner suffers damage in excess of 
the trespass fee,26 he may within a period of 96 hours of the discovery of 
such trespass, have the damage monetarily assessed by “two disinterested 
persons”.27 An identified stockowner must be informed of the trespass but 
only for the purposes of enabling the livestock owner to nominate one of the 
18 GG 15813 of 17-06-1994
19 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) 606H
20 608A-B
21 Natal Pound Ordinance s 7
22 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) 608C-D  See Natal 
Pound Ordinance s 25  
23 S 8
24 S 18
25 S 32
26 See s 27
27 S 29(b) stipulates that if the “disinterested persons” cannot reach an agreement as to the extent of the 
damage they may appoint an umpire to perform the task and if they cannot agree on an umpire, the 
Administrator of Natal must determine the extent
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“two disinterested persons”.28 The latter must either be a landowner or a voter 
as defined in section 1 of the Electoral Act 45 of 1979.29
Unclaimed impounded animals may be sold,30 not necessarily at market 
value, but at least at a price sufficient to recover all the amounts due under 
the ordinance.31 The poundkeeper must inform the local magistrate if any 
animal remains unsold whereupon the latter may give instructions as to 
whether the animal must be re-offered for sale, destroyed or otherwise 
disposed of. The poundkeeper may destroy unsold donkeys or pigs.32 Any 
balance, remaining after the proceeds of the sale have been applied to the 
said fees and the expenses must be paid to the livestock owner if known; 
otherwise it is forfeited to the provincial government.33 There is no obligation 
on any party to inform the stockowner of the sale. The mostly illiterate and 
otherwise socially disadvantaged livestock owners are expected to find out 
about the sale of their livestock by going through the Provincial Gazettes or 
local newspapers.34
In the event that an animal is too wild, vicious or intractable to be driven 
to the pound, a police officer has the authority to issue instructions regarding 
its destruction or other disposal provided that notice is given to the owner, if 
known.35 If on the other hand the animal’s viciousness only manifests itself 
after the animal is in the pound, the authority to give such instructions rests 
with the magistrate. Again, notice must be given to the stockowner if they can 
be identified.36 The poundkeeper is required to record any injury to or death 
of the impounded animal as well as the cause of its death or injury,37 but there 
is no obligation to pass this information to the stockowner.38
The Constitutional Court identified the constitutional challenge to sections 
16(1), 33, 34 and 37 as the seizure and impoundment of trespassing livestock 
and their subsequent sale in execution without judicial intervention, and 
without notice to the stockowner where the latter is not known. This was 
categorised as a violation of the right of access to courts. The assessment of 
damage provision, section 29(1), was challenged on the ground that it had a 
discriminatory effect on African people and thus violated the constitutional 
right to equality. The landownership and franchise requirements, arguably, 
excluded African people from assessing damages for trespass.39
The constitutional complaint against sections 37 and 41(4) was that they do 
not make adequate provision for notice to the stockowner. This was argued to 
be a violation of the right to just administrative action guaranteed in section 
33 of the Constitution. The MEC contended that the impugned provisions do 
28 S 29(1)(a)
29 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) 608F-609C
30 Natal Pound Ordinance ss 33 and 34
31 S 34(3)
32 S 37
33 S 40
34 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) 609D-610B
35 Natal Pound Ordinance s 41(4)
36 S 10(2)
37 S 12
38 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) 610C-D
39 610G-I
616 STELL LR 2014 3
      
not prevent the owner of the impounded animals from approaching the court 
at any stage in the process to secure the release of unlawfully impounded 
animals.40 Furthermore they argued that if the impugned provisions limit 
any of the applicant’s constitutional rights, the limitation is justifiable under 
section 36(1) of the Constitution because the impugned provisions are 
necessary to deal with the problem of trespassing animals.41
The Constitutional Court pointed out that section 34 of the Constitution, 
which guarantees the right of access to courts, expressly recognises that 
especially intensely divisive social conflicts must not be resolved by resort 
to self-help, but equitably by impartial and independent tribunals.42 The 
Constitutional Court recognised the need to take immediate action against 
trespassing animals, but emphasised that such action must be limited in 
view of the nature of the right, and the existence of less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose concerned. A balance must be struck between the rights 
of landowners and the rights of livestock owners. Once the animals have been 
impounded, the judicial process must be allowed to supervise the execution, 
to avoid any further need for immediate action.43
In considering the constitutionality of sections 16(1), 33, 34 and 37 of the 
ordinance the Constitutional Court found that these provisions established 
an unconstitutional impounding scheme, triggered by section 16(1), which 
authorised the landowner to seize and impound trespassing livestock. The 
further sections permitted the poundkeeper to sell the impounded livestock 
in order to recover impoundment fees and other charges. The Constitutional 
Court therefore concluded that due to the fact that the impoundment system did 
not engage the judicial process at any stage, these sections were inconsistent 
with section 34 of the Constitution.44
With regard to section 29(1), which provides that only landowners 
and persons with the right to vote under the Electoral Act 45 of 1979 are 
competent to assess damage, the Constitutional Court held that this provision 
was manifestly and fundamentally racist in its purpose and effect, and 
thus irreconcilable with the right to equality enshrined in section 9(3) of 
the Constitution. The Constitutional Court ordered that this provision be 
struck down with immediate effect on the ground that the limitation concerned 
was not reasonable or justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.45
With regard to the constitutionality of sections 8, 12, 10(2), 37 and 41(4), the 
Constitutional Court reasoned that section 33 of the Constitution guaranteed 
everyone “the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair”. Therefore, the Constitutional Court had to consider first 
whether the provisions in question could be read in a manner consistent with 
the Constitution.46 The Constitutional Court pointed out that section 8, dealing 
40 Natal Pound Ordinance s 43(b) and (c)
41 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) 611A-C
42 611E, 612E and 613D
43 617C, 617E-F and I
44 627F-H read with 615C, 616E-617A and 627H
45 619F/G-621F and 631C
46 621I/J-622B and 622G
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with the public decision to impound animals, and section 12, concerning the 
decision to dispose of injured or dead animals, relate to the exercise of a public 
power. The magistrate performs a public duty when he issues instructions 
regarding the destruction or the disposal of vicious animals (section 10(2)) 
or when he re-offers or destroys unsold animals after an auction (section 37). 
The same can be said of the police officer who issues instructions to destroy 
or dispose of animals that are too vicious to be driven to the pound (section 
41(4)). Consequently, the Constitutional Court concluded that the exercise of 
the powers conferred by the impugned provisions constituted administrative 
action which had to be monitored.47
The Constitutional Court further found that the question as to whether 
the impugned provisions could be read so as to require steps to be taken 
to ascertain the identity of the stockowner where this could be done with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, was a matter of construction. It reasoned 
that there was nothing in the language of these provisions that excluded such 
steps from being taken. The impugned provisions could thus be construed 
consistently with the Constitution to require notice to the stockowner where 
the stockowner could, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, be established. 
Consequently the Constitutional Court held that sections 8, 10(2) and 41(4) 
had to be construed consistently with the Constitution to require notice to 
stockowners where the stockowners could, with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, be ascertained.48
Similarly, in addressing the question of whether the lack of an obligation in 
sections 12 and 37 to give notice to the stockowner constituted an exclusion 
of constitutional rights, the Constitutional Court decided that this was also a 
matter of construction. It pointed out that both sections were capable of being 
read so as to require prior notice where the stockowner was known or could 
be ascertained with the exercise of reasonable diligence. The Constitutional 
Court held that if these provisions are construed in such a manner, they are not 
inconsistent with section 33 of the Constitution and thus passed constitutional 
muster. Consequently, it was held that sections 12 and 37 had to be construed 
as requiring prior notice to stockowners, who are known or reasonably 
ascertainable with the exercise of reasonable diligence.49 The Constitutional 
Court concluded that all persons who were required to implement the 
provisions of sections 8, 10(2), 12, 37 and 41(4) had to do so in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution as set out above.50
The Constitutional Court suspended the order of invalidity in respect of 
sections 16(1), 33, 34 and 37 for a period of twelve months in order to allow 
the Provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-Natal to correct the constitutional 
defects in the Natal Pound Ordinance. Pending the enactment of the relevant 
legislation, magistrates’ courts were empowered to authorise impoundment 
sales. This was authorised on the following conditions: the poundkeeper, on 
47 624B/C-D/E
48 626H, 627B-C and 631C-D
49 624H/I-625D and 631D-E
50 631E
618 STELL LR 2014 3
      
notice to stockowners who were known or could be located with reasonable 
diligence, lodged with the magistrate’s court a statement setting forth all the 
amounts due; the stockowner does not dispute the amounts within seven days 
of such notice; and the magistrate is satisfied that notice had been given to 
the stockowner or the stockowner cannot be ascertained with the exercise 
of reasonable diligence.51 In a sequel to Zondi the Constitutional Court 
reluctantly granted a further suspension of the invalidity order on the ground 
that the public will suffer considerable prejudice if the order of suspension 
were not extended in the absence of a mechanism for dealing immediately and 
effectively with trespassing and straying animals. The Court concluded that it 
was just and equitable to extend the period of suspension of the declaration of 
invalidity by a further twelve months to 15 October 2006.52
3  Consequences of Zondi
At this point it is convenient to summarise the consequences of Zondi for 
our purpose. In the first place the Constitutional Court in Zondi directed that 
the scheme created by the combination of section 16(1) and sections 33, 34 
and 37 must be replaced with a scheme which allows for judicial supervision. 
The scheme permits the landowner to seize the livestock and cause it to 
be detained and sold by the poundkeeper on conditions stipulated by the 
poundkeeper. This system denies the livestock owner the protection of the 
judicial process for the assessment of the damage suffered and supervision 
over the process of attachment and sale in execution. Instead of employing 
the ordinary civil process of execution, the landowner is permitted to bypass 
the courts and recover damages assessed by private persons through an 
execution process carried out by a private businessperson or an official of 
a municipality, without any court intervention. The impounding scheme 
effectively removes judicial intervention from sharp conflicts which will 
often underlie the process of impoundment. It also undermines and restricts 
the right against self-help guaranteed in section 34 of the Constitution.53 
The Constitutional Court therefore decided that once the animals have been 
impounded, supervision should be exercised by the courts through their rules 
over the process of execution, denied by the above sections of the ordinance.54 
This means that the administrative procedure under the pound ordinance may 
no longer necessarily be cheaper and speedier than the procedure under the 
actio de pastu.
A further consequence of Zondi is that the assessment of damages caused 
by stray stock can no longer be performed by private persons nominated by the 
landowner and the stockowner.55 The assessment must now be incorporated 
in the judicial process established for supervising the executory process of 
impoundment.
51 631G-632E
52 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2006 3 SA 1 (CC) paras 43-46 and 53-66
53 Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC) 616B-617A
54 617I-618A
55 620A/B and 621D
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The third consequence of Zondi is that the landowner and the poundkeeper 
will henceforth be required to exercise great care to identify the stockowner 
and to notify him or her at all stages of the execution process of what is 
happening to his or her stock.56 This means that sale of impounded animals 
would now seldom take place without the identity of the stockowner being 
known. This justifiably places an additional burden on the landowner.57
4  KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act 3 of 2006
The MEC took cognisance of the judgment in Zondi and presented a 
constitutionally acceptable draft Bill to the provincial Legislature of KwaZulu-
Natal. The latter body assented to the Pound Bill on 4 October 2006 and the 
KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act came into operation on 10 October 2006.58 The 
Act repealed the Natal Pound Ordinance 32 of 1947 as amended.59 The most 
important changes introduced by the new Ordinance are the following:
Section 5 tightens up the duties of the landowner with regard to stray 
animals found on his land. He may seize animals for impounding, but may not 
remove them unless he has notified the stockowner in writing no less than 72 
hours prior to such removal. No stray animal may be kept for a period longer 
than six hours without being supplied with adequate food and water and the 
landowner must comply strictly with the provisions of the Code of Practice on 
the Handling and Transportation of Impounded Animals.60
If a veterinarian or a member of the Police Service considers that the animal 
is too vicious, intractable or wild to be impounded, he or she may authorise 
the humane destruction or other disposal of the animal after notifying the 
stockowner and supplying him with reasons for the destruction.61 In the event 
that the stockowner requests the release of the animal prior to the removal to 
the pound, the landowner may release the animal forthwith or in the alternative 
apply to court for authority to impound the animal or to claim any damages 
caused. The court may then make any order that it deems fit.62
Animals must be taken to the nearest pound and animals of different species 
must be separated at all times.63 The landowner must supply the poundkeeper 
with written information about the number and description of the animals 
in question, the land concerned and the distance in kilometres to the nearest 
pound as well as a copy of the notice that he or she was obliged to send to the 
stockowner 72 hours before impounding the animal.64
The poundkeeper must immediately release an impounded animal on 
proof of ownership by the stockowner and on payment of the fees and costs 
56 624F-H, 625C-J, 626B and 627B-C
57 For a different perspective on Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 
589 (CC), see N Olivier & A Reddy “A Constitutional Perspective on the Validity of the KwaZulu-Natal 
Pounds Legislation: Zondi v Member of the Executive Council 73/03” (2005) 26 Obiter 783
58 Provincial Gazette 6513 of 10-10-2006  
59 KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act Sch 4
60 S 5(3) and (4) and Sch 1  In terms of s 8 the landowner may not work, use or ill-treat the animal  
61 S 6
62 S 7
63 S 9
64 S 10
620 STELL LR 2014 3
      
concerned.65 It is notable that no mention is made of the damages alleged by 
the landowner.
With regard to the sale of impounded animals, section 21 prescribes that 
the poundkeeper must within fourteen days of impounding apply to court for 
authority to sell the animal. This application must be accompanied by proof 
that the poundkeeper had lodged a statement with the stockowner in which he 
sets out the fees and costs incurred by him and the damage that the landowner 
has suffered. Then, irrespective of whether the amounts in question are 
disputed, the court must summarily enquire into the matter66 (which includes 
an enquiry as to whether the stockowner has been notified) and make such an 
order as it considers just and equitable. The order may include an order as to 
costs as well as an order dealing with the process that the poundkeeper must 
follow in the sale of the animal.
An application to court for the impoundment of an animal in terms of 
section 7(2)(b) must comply with the procedure referred to in rule 55 of the 
Rules of Court.67 Section 7(2)(b) provides that in the event that the landowner 
refuses to hand over animals which strayed onto his land at the request of the 
stockowner, he may apply to the magistrate’s court for authority to impound 
the animals or to claim any damages he or she may have suffered. Such an 
application must then comply with the procedure referred to in rule 55 of the 
Rules of Court. The application must thus be brought on notice of motion 
supported by an affidavit as to the facts upon which the applicant relies for 
relief. The court may then make any order including an order as to costs that 
the court deems just and equitable.
An application to court for the sale of an impounded animal must comply 
with the procedure in terms of section 66 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 
1944 and Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, read with the necessary changes.68
In the event that an impounded animal is sold at a price in excess of the 
cumulative total of the fees and costs incurred by the poundkeeper and the 
damage alleged by the landowner, such excess must be paid to the stockowner 
within 30 days of the sale and, if the owner cannot be identified, into the 
municipal revenue fund.69 If animals are unsuccessfully offered for sale, 
section 23 stipulates that the poundkeeper must immediately advise the court 
and the stockowner of the animal’s estimated value and the fees and costs 
incurred. The court may then make such order as it deems just and equitable.
Finally, section 27(d) stipulates that a person who contravenes any provision 
of the Act is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine, or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months.
In conclusion it may be noted that in line with Zondi, the Act contains 
express provisions to notify stockowners of every step in the process of 
impounding: no animal seized for impounding may be removed to a pound 
65 S 20  Besides pound fees, the stockowner must pay the cost of any dipping, inoculation, medical care and 
other treatment necessary or required in terms of the Act or any other law, in accordance with Sch 3 (s 19)  
66 This includes an enquiry as to whether the stockowner has been notified
67 S 26(a)  
68 S 26(b)  Rule 41 of the Rules of Court deals with the execution against movable property
69 KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act s 24
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without 72 hours prior notice being given to the stockowner;70 in the event of 
the humane destruction or other disposal of animals found to be too vicious, 
intractable or wild to be impounded, written justification and notice must 
be given to the stockowner;71 the poundkeeper must always immediately 
give written notice of the impoundment to the stockowner;72 where on 
application by the poundkeeper, the court authorises destruction or other 
disposal of impounded animals, the poundkeeper must immediately notify 
the stockowner accordingly;73 the poundkeeper must immediately notify the 
stockowner in writing if the animal is infected with certain diseases74 or when 
the animal dies or is injured;75in the event that animals are unsuccessfully 
offered for sale, the poundkeeper must immediately inform the stockowner of 
its estimated value and the fees and costs incurred.76
5  KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act versus actio de pastu
A landowner who finds trespassing animals on his farm in KwaZulu-Natal 
must consider carefully whether it is worthwhile impounding stray animals 
instead of instituting the actio de pastu for damages suffered.
As a preliminary point it should be noted that the impounding landowner 
is saddled with a number of duties without adequate remuneration,77 and may 
be guilty of an offence in case of non-compliance.78 Fees for mere trespass 
may no longer be claimed. This compels the landowner to prove his loss in 
court for the smallest loss suffered. As is the case under the replaced Natal 
Pound Ordinance,79 a poundkeeper who is of the opinion that an impounded 
animal is vicious, permanently disabled or terminally ill, may apply to the 
magistrate’s court which may authorise the destruction or disposal of such 
animal.80 Similarly, if an impounded animal is injured or dies, this fact must 
be recorded in the pound register and the stockowner must be notified.81 It 
stands to reason that no damage will be recoverable in the case of death and 
much less than usual if the animal is ill. In addition, the landowner who does 
not know the identity of the owner of donkeys or pigs found trespassing, or 
who cannot identify them with the exercise of reasonable care, may no longer 
destroy any of these animals if unmarked.82 Similarly, poultry or pigeons 
70 S 5(1)
71 S 6
72 S 13
73 S 14(2)(b)
74 S 15(c)
75 S 17(b)
76 S 23(a)
77 He must notify the stockowner in writing prior to removal to the pound (s 5(1)); he may not keep the 
animal for more than six hours without providing adequate food and water (s 5(3)) and he must comply 
with the provisions of the code of good Practice on the Handling of impounded Animals contained in 
Sch 1 (s 5(4))
78 S 27(d)
79 Natal Pound Ordinance s 10(2)
80 KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act s 14(2)
81 Ss 12, 17  
82 Natal Pound Ordinance s 18  
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trespassing on land and doing damage to crops or garden produce may no 
longer be summarily destroyed.83
The process of impounding is no longer such a cheap and speedy alternative. 
At almost every stage of the proceedings, a court order must be sought and 
many hurdles must be overcome before the landowner will be satisfied from 
the proceeds of a sale in execution of the impounded animal. In terms of 
section 5 the straying animal may not be removed to the nearest pound unless 
the landowner has given written notice to the stockowner no less than 72 hours 
prior to the removal. During this 72 hour period, the stockowner may request 
that the landowner releases the animal prior to its removal to the pound.84 If 
the owner refuses to release the animal, he may apply to court for authority to 
impound the animal or to claim damages for loss suffered.
Section 26(a) provides that impoundment in terms of the Act must comply 
with the procedure laid down in rule 55 of the Rules of Court. This rule 
stipulates that the application must be brought on notice of motion supported 
by an affidavit as to the facts upon which the applicant (landowner) relies for 
impounding the animal.85 The notice must be addressed to the stockowner 
and to the clerk of the court.86 In the notice of motion the landowner must 
inter alia set forth a date not less than five days after service of the motion 
before which the stockowner is to notify the applicant whether he opposes 
the application. If no such notification is given, the application will be heard 
on a stated date not less than ten days after service of the notice on the 
stockowner.87 If the matter is opposed the process will take longer in view of 
answering affidavits and possible affidavits in reply.88 It may be possible to 
satisfy the court that the matter is urgent in which case the court may dispose 
of the matter at such time and place and in accordance with such procedure as 
the court deems appropriate.89
If the stockowner does not request the release of the stock which had 
trespassed on the land within the 72 hour period, the animals may be 
impounded to be eventually sold by the poundkeeper. The stockowner is, 
however, entitled in terms of section 20 to request the release of the impounded 
animals on providing proof of ownership of the animal and on payment of any 
fee and costs due to the poundkeeper. If the owner is not able to pay the fees 
and costs concerned, the poundkeeper may retain such animal to recover such 
fees and costs.90 As highlighted above, there is no provision for payment 
of the damage suffered by the landowner. This means that the landowner 
would have to institute an action in court to claim compensation for damage 
suffered.91
83 S 31  The KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act does not include poultry and pigeons in their definition of animals
84 KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act s 7(1)  
85 Rule 55(1)(a) of the Rules of Court
86 Rule 55(1)(b)
87 Rule 55(1)(e)(iii)
88 Rule 55(1)(g)
89 Rule 55(5)(a)
90 KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act s 20(2)  
91 See s 25
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The sale of impounded animals is also placed under the supervision of the 
court. The poundkeeper must within fourteen days of the impounding of the 
animal apply to court for authority to sell the animal. In the application which 
is brought on notice of motion, the poundkeeper must provide the court with 
proof that he has lodged a statement with the stockowner indicating all the 
amounts, including fees, costs and damages due in terms of the Act.92 It is 
expressly provided that the statement must include the fees and costs incurred 
by the poundkeeper and the amount of any damages suffered by the landowner 
through the trespass.93 Irrespective of whether or not the damages claimed 
are disputed, the court must then summarily enquire into the matter, enquire 
whether the poundkeeper notified the stockowner and make such order as it 
considers just and equitable including an order as to cost and on the process 
to be followed by the poundkeeper in the sale of the animal.94 If the sums in 
question are disputed, the stockowner must normally produce an affidavit as 
to the facts on which he relies. However, on these facts the magistrate must 
summarily base his order as to damages to be paid by the stockowner. The 
fact that this can be decided on motion means that if the process reached this 
stage, it would still be speedier than an action procedure under the actio de 
pastu for damages.
The sale of the impounded animal must comply with the procedure 
prescribed in section 66 of the Magistrates’ Court Act and Rule 41 of the 
Rules of Court, read with the necessary changes. We have seen that one of the 
outcomes of an application by the poundkeeper to the court for authority to sell 
the animal would be an order for the payment of money for damage suffered 
by the landowner. Section 66 of the KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act provides that 
whenever a court gives judgment for the payment of money, failure to pay 
such money forthwith shall be executable by sale in execution of the movable 
property of the judgment debtor, or if insufficient, his immovable property.95 
Execution must then occur in accordance with Rule 41 with the necessary 
changes. On receipt of a warrant to levy execution on movable property, the 
sheriff would presumably indicate the impounded animal as executable and 
draw up an inventory and valuation of the animal.96 The result would be that 
the animal’s inventoried value shall be deemed to be judicially attached.97 
The sheriff must then hand a copy of the inventory and the attachment to the 
stockowner.98 Since the animal is safely impounded, it need not be removed 
to a place of security.99 We have seen that the court, in the application for 
authority to sell the impounded animal, can make an order as to the process 
to be followed by the poundkeeper in the sale of the animal. If this has been 
92 S 21(1)
93 S 21(2)
94 S 21(3)
95 S 66(1)(a)
96 Rule 41(1)(a) of the Rules of Court  Since Rule 41 must be read with the necessary changes, it does not 
seem competent for the sheriff to make an inventory of the other movable property at the residence of the 
stockowner  The land owner is thus restricted to the proceeds on sale of the impounded animal  
97 Rule 41(4)
98 Rule 41(5)
99 Rule 41(7)
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done, this order must be implemented. If no such order has been made, the 
poundkeeper must follow Rule 41 which states that the property must be 
sold publicly for cash with the approval of the magistrate by an auctioneer 
to the highest bidder.100 Certain requirements as to notice of the sale and 
advertisement in the local or other newspaper must also be complied with.101 
The day appointed for the sale in execution must not be less than fifteen days 
after attachment.102
If the proceeds of the sale are sufficient to cover the fees, costs and damages 
awarded for loss suffered by the landowner, the recovery of the damage in terms 
of the KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act would prove to be speedier than the recovery 
of damages in action proceedings under the actio de pastu. The reason for 
this is that proceedings for the recovery of damages under the KwaZulu-Natal 
Pound Act are motion proceedings and not action proceedings.
In the final analysis, the landowner is in a very difficult position if the 
owner of the stray animals cannot be located or if the owner does not swiftly 
collect the strays. Due to the fact that the animals have come under his control, 
the landowner may be sued in negligence for damages caused to motorists 
colliding with these animals if driven from the farm onto a public road.103 
The only alternative open to him will be to make use of the provisions of the 
KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act to remove the animals by impounding them, and 
thereby preventing further damage or recurrent trespassing on his land.104
6  Concluding remarks
The Constitutional Court has brought about a radical change in the way 
in which impoundment of stray animals is regarded by the South African 
community. By the application of constitutional principles the Court has 
succeeded in creating a fine balance between the competing rights of 
stockowners who are traditionally dependent on their cattle, sheep and 
goats for their livelihood, and the right of farmers to be protected against 
the nuisance and damage caused by unknown animals trespassing on their 
farms. We have seen that although the KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act of 2006 has 
littered the path of the landowner with obstacles, the fact that it allows motion 
proceedings to found a judgment debt has made it possible for proceedings in 
terms of the KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act to deliver a speedier resolution than 
the action procedure under the actio de pastu.
In view of Zondi it will be incumbent on various regional legislatures 
to scrutinise their pound legislation to determine whether it will pass 
constitutional muster. The crucial aspects pertain to notice which must 
100 Rule 41(8)(a)
101 Rule 41(8)(b) and (c)
102 Rule 41(9)
103 Prinsloo v Girardin 1962 4 SA 391 (T); Mkhwanazi v Van der Walt 1995 4 SA 589 (A); Enslin v Nhlapo 
2008 5 SA 146 (SCA)
104 Note that the definition of “animal” in s 1 also includes a dog and a cat  The possibility of impoundment 
of such animals may prove a stroke of luck for landowners  
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be given to stockowners whose animals have strayed onto farms;105 the 
way in which the region’s power to impound is worded; whether there is 
judicial supervision of the manner in which the damages of the landowner 
is determined;106 and whether the sale in execution of impounded animals 
is subjected to judicial scrutiny.107 This is especially pertinent with regard 
to the various regions in the old Cape Province where all the regions except 
Ciskei still seem to apply the old Cape Ordinance 18 of 1938. Although the old 
Transvaal Ordinance 13 of 1972 was repealed,108 new pound Acts have only 
been promulgated in Limpopo109 and North West and except for Gauteng, the 
old Transvaal Ordinance is apparently still in force in Mpumalanga.
The revision process was already commenced in the Eastern Cape High 
Court in June 2013 in Mdodana v Premier EC.110 Mdodana, whose goats 
were impounded, successfully instituted judicial proceedings to have certain 
provisions of the Cape Pounds Ordinance 18 of 1938 declared unconstitutional 
on more or less the same grounds as in Zondi. The Constitutional Court was 
then approached to confirm the decision of the High Court. The Constitutional 
Court then made contact with the Grahamstown Bar to help it make 
submissions as a friend of the court. The Bar argues that the impounding 
scheme, viewed in its proper context, is justified due to the fact that stray 
animals are a danger to motorists on public roads and a threat to commercial 
farmers. Furthermore they argue that any judicial supervision over the sale of 
impounded livestock will need an expeditious process to minimise the costs 
of maintaining impounded animals.111 It seems unlikely that these arguments 
will persuade the Constitutional Court to deviate from its judgment in Zondi.
SUMMARY
A landowner who finds animals trespassing on his land has the following alternatives: he can 
chase the animals off the land; impound the animals; or institute the actio de pastu for monetary 
compensation for damage caused to his land. Administrative proceedings under the pound ordinances 
were cheaper and speedier than action proceedings under the actio de pastu. After impoundment, 
the poundkeeper could sell the animals, without giving notice to the owners, and compensate the 
landowner for damage from the proceeds of sale. The constitutional validity of certain of the above 
provisions incorporated in the Natal Pound Ordinance 32 of 1947 was successfully challenged in the 
High Court of KwaZulu-Natal and confirmed by the Constitutional Court in 2005 in Zondi v MEC for 
105 The Limpopo Pounds Act s 8(c) requires that the poundmaster must notify the owner of the impounded 
stock but only if the owner’s name and address are known to the poundmaster  Under s 12(a) a person 
tendering stock must furnish to the poundmaster the name and address of the stockowner but only if 
known  See further Pounds Act (Ciskei) s 3(c), (v), (e); North West Animal Pounds Act s 5(1) (notice to be 
given where possible)  
106 Limpopo Pounds Act s 14(b) provides that the damage and compensation payable to the landowner may 
be determined by agreement between the stockowner and landowner, or if no agreement is reached, by the 
Municipal Manager of the area in which the land is situated  See further Cape Pounds Ordinance ss 34-35; 
OFS Pound Ordinance ss 32-33; Pounds Act (Ciskei) s 9(1); North West Animal Pounds Act s 22
107 Cape Pounds Ordinance ss 63-69; OFS Pound Ordinance s 37; Pounds Act (Ciskei) s 11; Limpopo Pounds 
Act s 16; North West Animal Pounds Act s 18
108 Limpopo Pounds Act; Gauteng Local Government Laws Amendment Act 1 of 2006 sch 1
109 The sch to the Limpopo Pounds Act repealed the Gazankulu Pounds Act 8 of 1976; the Venda Pounds Act 
6 of 1976; and the Lebowa Pounds Act 80 of 1990  
110 (1648/10) 2013 ZAECGHC 66 (13 June 2013) SAFLII <http://www saflii org/za/cases/ZAECGHC/2013/66
html> (accessed 03-01-2015)
111 See Cape Argus (13-11-2013) 17  
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Traditional and Local Government Affairs 2005 3 SA 589 (CC). The consequences of Zondi were that 
the administrative proceedings sanctioned by the Natal Pound Ordinance were replaced by judicial 
proceedings after impoundment through their rules over the process of execution, denied by the Natal 
Ordinance; assessment of damages caused by stray stock can no longer be made by private persons but 
must be incorporated in the judicial process established for supervising the process of impoundment; 
and the landowner and the poundkeeper are henceforth required to exercise care to identify the 
stockowner and to notify him or her at all stages of the execution process of what is happening to 
his or her stock. As a result of Zondi the KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act 3 of 2006 replaced the Natal 
Pounds Ordinance of 1947 with new legislation which would satisfy the constitutional dictates of 
Zondi. It is concluded that although the KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act has placed constitutional burdens 
on the landowner, the fact that it allows motion proceedings to found a judgment debt, means that 
impoundment proceedings would still be speedier than the action procedure under the actio de pastu.
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